

CONSUMER REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE  
PRODUCTS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

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CONSUMER REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE  
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THE PROBLEM

1. To examine certain aspects of the intelligence producer / user relationship as illuminated by various past surveys of consumer reactions to selected intelligence publications. The ultimate intent is to devise methods of eliciting comments from intelligence users which will provide the most helpful suggestions for product improvement.

INTRODUCTION

2. This study was initiated in response to the Presidential memorandum of 5 November 1971, "Organization and Management of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence Community," which, among other things, stated that:

"Significant improvement in the intelligence product is also needed. . . . An early task of the DCI should be the preparation of a comprehensive program focused upon improving the intelligence process and product."

3. Over the past twenty-odd years various elements of the intelligence community have used questionnaire surveys, personal interviews, informal conferences and other means to elicit consumer

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reactions to the format, scope, timeliness and usefulness of particular intelligence products.

4. The primary problem in the conduct of such surveys is to elicit thoughtful responses from all the important recipients for whose use the intelligence is written. It is fair to say that the addressees of many intelligence products tend to take them for granted -- the products arrive at their desks to be used or not, depending on how valid and timely they seem to the user and perhaps how well they accord with the user's own conclusions. Often the user is too busy to give much time to evaluating the impact intelligence has on the decisions he must make; furthermore, many users are not sufficiently familiar with the intelligence process to have confidence that they can offer valid suggestions on how the products could be improved.

5. Thus, responses to producer inquiry has tended to be cursory and has not often resulted in clear indications of what the producer might do to improve his service to the consumer.

6. Hopefully this study will lead to more fruitful methods of engaging the attention of intelligence consumers with respect to their intelligence needs.

## DISCUSSION

7. Various methods have been employed to solicit responses from intelligence consumers -- personal interviews, elaborate questionnaire surveys, informal conferences, and formal requests for "feedback" on specific intelligence products. Some of the more important of such surveys and their methodologies are discussed below. Fuller descriptions of these surveys are contained in the annex to this study.

### A. Surveys for Reactions to High-Level Users

8. Because intelligence is written for users at many levels in the government, it is most relevant to sum up the survey attempts as they relate to the various levels and types of users. Accordingly, this section deals with attempts to survey reader reactions to the types of publications which are primarily prepared for high-level consumers; i. e., National Estimates. Estimates are of course distributed widely but they are mainly intended to serve high-level readership.

9. The Board of National Estimates has, ever since its establishment, been aware of the desirability of feedback from readers of national estimates. Three separate types of attempts have been undertaken by the B/NE to elicit reader reaction over the past twenty years. These are: personal interviews with high-level addressees following the issuance of estimates; questionnaires accompanying

certain estimates; and meetings with principal users to discuss the form and content for estimates which would be most useful to the consumer.

10. Response to 1955 NIE Survey: This survey was done to ascertain NIE circulation, determine who were the ultimate consumers, ascertain how extensively the NIE's were actually used, and uncover the extent to which they met user needs. It involved distribution of a written questionnaire and a series of interviews with a sample of policy-maker consumers. It showed that only a relatively few NIE's were seen by the President or department heads (who usually read only the conclusions of these NIEs) but that they were read extensively by second and third echelon officials. NIEs were most generally used for background purposes. Some complaints were voiced as to form and content, but the survey did not point clearly to any preferred directions of change and none were made. The survey did, however, result in recommendations that each Intelligence Advisory Committee member reexamine NIE distribution to ensure that appropriate officials in each agency receive NIEs, that each member brief new key officials in his agency on the NIE and means at their disposal for initiating new NIEs responsive to specific problems they might encounter.

11. Survey of NIE Distribution (1959-60): This questionnaire survey was undertaken to ascertain why the distribution of NIEs had increased from 250 to 365 over the previous five years and to determine how distribution was controlled. It was not intended to elicit comments concerning format and content of NIEs, but it did produce answers which indicated that the use of NIEs had substantially increased and that the significance of NIEs had become more firmly established throughout the government.

12. Direct Queries to Secretaries of Defense and State: In November 1969 the DCI addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense asking for their suggestions as to how NIEs on Soviet military subjects might be made "most useful" to them. This was the first instance on record in which the DCI directly solicited the comments of such senior officials concerning the NIE product. As a result of their suggestions, NIEs on Soviet military subjects now have a lengthened summary and conclusions section at their beginning and NIE 11-4 (now titled "Issues and Options in Soviet Military Policy") is considerably expanded in scope and depth over previous issues. An additional change which was made at the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense is the inclusions of alternative five-year projections of Soviet force levels, based on different assumptions as to the success of SALT, U. S. alternate force levels, etc.

13. Meetings with the White House Staff in 1970: ONE

Board and Staff members conducted a series of meetings with Dr. Kissinger's staff concerning the form and content of military estimates prior to the preparation of these estimates in 1970. As a result, a great deal more factual material was included, together with an expanded scope of discussion of the factors leading to the conclusions. The new NIE 11-8 was particularly successful, for the DCI was commended by the President by letter for this estimate.

B. Surveys Involving High, Middle and Lower-Level Users

14. Some types of publications are given widespread distribution involving readers at many levels of government. Examples are the National Intelligence Survey, CIA's Weekly Intelligence Summary, and certain DoD intelligence products. This section summarizes efforts made to survey readers of these publications.

15. Response to National Intelligence Survey Questionnaire and Personal Interviews (1969): Some 2,338 questionnaires were sent to individual NIS recipients at many government levels and about 45 percent were returned. The intent was to ascertain the levels at which the NIS was used, the degree of use, how it was used, and how useful it was in urgent situations. Space was provided for negative comments,



criticisms and suggestions for product improvement. As a supplement, personal interviews were conducted with a number of recipients in many areas of the world. Despite the good numerical response to the questionnaire, there was no clear-cut indication as to how the NIS might be made more useful. The NIS was found to be used primarily for "background" information, as expected. The most common complaint was that NIS products should be more current; this also was expected. There were no strong surprises in any significant number of responses and the survey did not produce feasible alternatives for its reshaping. The personal interviews indicated that there was a high appreciation of the NIS in many military commands, but that many diplomatic posts did not find the product particularly useful. Again, there was no strong guidance as to how the product might best be altered to enhance its utility.

16. Response to "Current Intelligence Weekly Summary Survey (1971): A similar number of individual recipients (2,230) of CIA's "Current Intelligence Weekly Summary" were surveyed via questionnaire in 1971 to ascertain their reactions and suggestions for improvement. About 25 percent responded and the major findings indicated that the publication was used chiefly for "background" and that fewer than 10 percent of the respondents had concrete suggestions

for product improvement. The survey concluded that the readership, for the most part, is "prepared to accept the producer's decisions as to what should be reported."

17. Response to Survey of Readership of Defense Department Intelligence Products (1970): Readers of 508 Defense Department intelligence periodic products were surveyed by questionnaire to ascertain, primarily, which products were duplicative, not responsive, or could be improved. Some 151 organizations participated in the survey; all but nine responded positively and some 12,800 individual product ratings were received. The high response in comparison to the NIS and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review surveys probably is due to the fact that organizations rather than individuals were asked to respond and that chains of command were involved. At any rate, the survey ultimately resulted in the elimination of some 40 products as being undesirably duplicative. Nevertheless, the survey did not provide guidelines as to general product improvement.

C. Surveys Primarily Involving Lower-Level Users

18. There are a relatively large number of intelligence publications which are intended to satisfy the needs of individual users who are not in high-level policy-making positions. Such publications generally contain specialized material of interest

primarily to researchers and not to those who must react with day-to-day policy decisions. Two surveys of reader reaction to such publications have been conducted in recent years.

19. Response to Survey of Readers of CIA's Scientific Intelligence Digest (1965): A questionnaire was attached to an issue of this publication as a means of determining how its usefulness might be increased. About 850 questionnaires were involved and only 110 replies were received. The Digest is given wide distribution but most of its copies are sent to other elements of the intelligence community and to researchers in the middle and lower levels of government. Recipients were queried as individuals; results were unsatisfactory because of the limited response and because of conflicting ideas on how the publication might be altered. As a result, no substantial changes in product content or format were instituted.

20. Response to Survey of Foreign Technology Divisions/AFSC Products (1969-70): The survey of reaction to FTD products followed a somewhat different course than the other surveys described in this section. It was conducted in two phases, the first involving an attempt to ascertain how adequately the finished products responded to standing user requirements, and the second employed a questionnaire

designed to elicit more information about the use they had for intelligence and what their intelligence needs were. Questionnaires were sent to some 267 user organizations and 124 were returned. This survey was considered successful in that it provided considerable insight as to user dissatisfaction and it indicated areas in which liaison between users and producers could be improved.

### CONCLUSIONS

21. The record of attempts to survey consumer reaction to intelligence publications in order that intelligence producers better understand how to make their products more useful is not encouraging. Various methods of eliciting reactions have been tried, but the problem of getting consumers to focus their thinking on intelligence needs and reconciling various consumer ideas on product format, timeliness and content seem to preclude hope that a single method of successfully surveying consumer reaction to widely distributed publications, at least, can be developed. Nevertheless, from the surveys conducted to date, certain useful conclusions can be made. These are:

- a. That the form questionnaire will not be useful if it is addressed to a wide variety of recipients at various governmental levels, particularly if it is intended to produce consensus on how specific intelligence products should be improved.

b. That users of "general purpose" or "background" intelligence publications do not have much of a stake in providing impetus for changing intelligence publications -- they tend to leave choices regarding format, content and timeliness of publications to the producer.

c. If questionnaires are to be sent, response will be greatest if they are sent via chains of command. (The argument against this approach is that responses will not be as frank as they might be if they were returned without organization or personal attribution.)

d. Personal interviews offer the best promise of getting reaction in depth to specific intelligence publications, but personal interviews can feasibly be conducted only with a limited number of consumers.

e. The best method of eliciting constructive comment involves a direct request from the highest level intelligence authority to the primary users of a given product. It is these reactions which should be sought and not those from lower-level consumers.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

22. In view of the above, it is recommended that:

a. Future attempts to make high level publications (NIEs) most relevant to the needs of their users should involve direct

queries of the primary consumers (i. e. , the Secretaries of State and Defense, etc. ) as to what subjects they want presented, how frequently and in what format. Needs of other users must be subordinated, if necessary, so that the publication needs of the primary users are best met.

b. For publications intended for dissemination to many levels of government, a questionnaire together with personal interviews should occasionally be used to see whether customers are satisfied with the product or to test out customer reaction to changes envisioned by the producer.

c. For publications written essentially for the background use of those in the lower level in government, content, format and timeliness can essentially be left to the producer.

d. The problem of satisfying the specific needs of the very highest levels of government is so crucial to the success of the intelligence community that it would behoove the producers of NIEs, NSSMs, memoranda and current intelligence for the White House and the National Security Council to schedule periodic meetings with officials of these organizations or their representatives to plan out the production of intelligence to satisfy their specific needs. Thus, it should be possible to schedule Estimates which would meet the foreseeable needs of the primary users; it should also be possible to conduct the

primary research for NSSMs according to a relatively fixed schedule; it should be possible to ascertain which subjects would be usefully treated in special memoranda and which subjects should be treated in current intelligence publications (and which should not). Accordingly, it is recommended that the NSCIC be asked to sponsor the notion of scheduled meetings between intelligence producers (Chairman, B/NE; DDI, CIA; DD/S&T, CIA; Director, INR; and Director, DIAP, DIA) and representatives of the NSC to obtain clear understanding of what intelligence subjects should be covered, in what depth and style, and how frequently.

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Annex

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CONSUMER NEEDS

Action project

Survey of Consumer Reaction to Intelligence Products

This study will use questionnaires to survey consumer reactions to the present scope, quality, timeliness and usefulness of designated U.S. intelligence products, and to identify any specific areas of dissatisfaction on which corrective action is indicated.

The questionnaire will be developed and the survey conducted by a task group, chairman of which will be designated by the D/DCI/NIPE, with representation from all NSCIC Working Group agencies.

Results of the survey will be submitted to the NSCIC Working Group for consideration, and for the preparation of recommendations to the NSCIC as appropriate.

(Excerpt from attachment to memo for members of NSCIC Working Group, Subject: Work Program Agenda, dated 27 January 1971)

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Excerpt from Minutes of Second Meeting of NSCIC Working Group,  
4 February 1972

- "c. Survey of consumer reaction to intelligence products:  
The Working Group considered questionnaires to be of doubtful  
value and the proposal was not approved."

ANNEX A

SURVEYING CONSUMER REACTIONS TO  
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The expansion of the U. S. intelligence community since World War II has resulted, among other things, in a marked increase in the output of intelligence products--estimates, serial publications, reports, bulletins, memoranda, etc. Wide variation exists in the audiences to which individual products are addressed and in the number of copies which are disseminated. Because of concern as to whether the right audience was being reached and whether the products themselves were responsive to the need of consumers, various intelligence organizations have conducted surveys of one type or another to measure consumer reactions, usually in the interest of obtaining comments which could provide basis for improvement of the product. Brief descriptions of the more important of such efforts, and an assessment of the results achieved, are presented in the following sections.

B. SURVEYS OF USER REACTIONS TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

2. Survey of 1955

a. In February 1955 the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Board of National Estimates to conduct an informal survey of the use which consumers made of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's). The survey, which was undertaken after four years experience with the national estimate system, was intended to shed light on (1) whether NIE's were circulated appropriately; (2) who, besides the National Security Council, were the ultimate consumers; (3) how extensively NIE's were actually used by these consumers; and (4) the extent to which, as then written, the NIE's met such needs.

b. The survey was conducted in two stages. The first was a written questionnaire addressed to all offices and agencies receiving NIE's and intended to indicate NIE dissemination within each agency. The second stage was a series of interviews with a sample of policy-maker consumers to ascertain what use they actually made of NIE's. The survey was not intended to obtain opinions regarding the adequacy of NIE content or judgments on changes to make them

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more useful. The primary goal was to establish the distribution pattern of NIE's and to indicate the kinds of uses to which they were put.

c. The survey indicated that an average of 249 NIE's were distributed regularly to the White House, the NSC, the Operations Coordinating Board and the major departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Many of these were further distributed to major commands and missions outside Washington.

d. Only a relatively few NIE's (selected by intelligence and screening officers) were seen by the President and department or agency heads, and in such cases these top-level individuals usually read only the conclusions, briefs, or selected portions. The exceptions were most likely to be NIE's dealing with crisis situations requiring urgent and high-level policy decisions. NIE's were, however, found to be extensively read by second and third echelon officials in major departments and agencies and by various staffs responsible for national security planning and execution. It appeared that some NIE's did not reach all of the departmental policy or planning levels or other key officials who might have found them useful. In some cases, this appeared to result from failure of subordinates to pass the NIE's to their chiefs, and in others the criteria for distribution appeared to be overly restrictive.

e. NIE's were found to be most generally used for background purposes, although some were used in working on specific planning and policy problems. The majority of users indicated that the format and problem coverage of NIE's were adequate, but many expressed dissatisfaction with particular NIE's. There were complaints that the NIE's were too long to be read in full by top-level individuals; they were said by some to be too general for detailed use in policy planning and execution; and some were said to be not relevant or sufficiently timely for use in consideration of specific policy problems. Overall importance of such complaints was not considered sufficient to warrant action to alter the format or content of NIE's. Each Intelligence Advisory Committee \* member was asked to reexamine the pattern of NIE distribution so as to improve the usefulness of NIE's to the policy, planning and executive branches of his agency. Each IAC agency was

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\* Succeeded by the U. S. Intelligence Board on 15 September 1958

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requested to brief new key officials within its department on the nature of the NIE and the means at their disposal for requesting NIE's responsive to specific intelligence problems they might have.

3. Conference with the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (1957)

The DCI, Director of National Estimates and his BNE members met on 25 July 1957 with Robert W. Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning to discuss the form and content of the NIE program. Mr. Bowie's suggestions to enhance the usefulness of NIE's to the policy planning process were as follows:

- a. There was undue emphasis on precise statements of probability, with too little discussion of underlying factors.
- b. In many cases, it would be useful to discuss more possibilities, even if they had only a 20 percent chance of eventuating.
- c. The estimate should show the degree to which predictions were based on evidence as opposed to judgment.
- d. Estimates should put more stress on the degree to which U. S. action could affect the predicted line of development, and what kinds of U. S. action could have impact.
- e. NIE's were not very readable, even on interesting subjects--the conclusions were "dehydrated" and lacked flavor. He also suggested that the IAC promulgate as "think pieces" a series of papers written by a single person or a small group (in the manner for Foreign Affairs articles) for consideration by policy-makers.

4. Survey of NIE Distribution (1959-1960)

- a. This survey effort had two aspects: (1) the circulation of a questionnaire enclosed in seven selected NIE's published during the period July 1959 to February 1960 to obtain certain detailed information regarding the readership of NIE's, and (2) an inquiry to the distribution offices of the USIB agencies to

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determine how NIE distribution is controlled. The latter is not relevant to the present study. The survey was undertaken to investigate the nature of and causes for an apparent large increase in NIE distribution from 250 in 1956; by 1960 some 365 copies of NIE's were regularly being sent to recipients according to a standard distribution list, and about 85 more were held in reserve for special distribution. The survey ascertained that the substantial increase since 1956 was attributed to the following factors:

- (1) Natural expansion of readership as the utility and significance of NIE's became more firmly established throughout the government.
- (2) The growing number of senior officials who required NIE's in carrying out their responsibilities.
- (3) An increasing number of users in the intelligence community itself.
- (4) The succession of world crises which generated increased interest in national intelligence on the part of commanders and planners.
- (5) A general increase in the number of people in the government concerned with the communist threat throughout the world, developments in modern technological warfare, and the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Bloc.
- (6) The addition of new readers overseas--political advisors, ambassadors, and military planners and commanders.
- (7) Agency reorganizations, including changes in locations of offices.
- (8) An increase in the size, responsibility, and complexity of agencies served by NIE's.
- (9) The establishment or expansion of reference and library facilities in the USIB agencies.

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(10) An increase in the number of NIE's released to foreign governments. (From about 26 to 45)

(11) An apparent increase in readers whose need to know might be marginal.

b. An analysis of the returns from 636 respondents of the questionnaire addressed to NIE recipients indicated that about 50 percent were engaged in intelligence, 19 percent had responsibilities in policy planning and coordination, and 8 percent were in operations. Only 7 percent listed themselves in the area of research. However, a substantial number of readers (34 percent) indicated that they read only the NIE conclusions. The questionnaire (at Tab 1) did not solicit ideas on how NIE's might be improved.

5. Queries to Secretaries of Defense and State re Soviet Military Estimates (1969)

a. In November 1969 the DCI asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for their views or suggestions as to how National Estimates on Soviet military subjects might be made "most useful" to them. Questions included: (1) is the division by subject (Strategic Attack, Strategic Defense, and General Purpose Forces) the best way of presenting the estimates; (2) is the amount of detail presented excessive and should there be different types of estimates for different readers; and (3) do existing procedures provide intelligence judgments of most vital interest, together with adequate evidence or argument, and are dissents presented adequately?

b. The Secretary of State offered no "fundamental" criticism, but his suggestions for "refinements" were as follows:

- There could be "summary estimates" for the top policy makers, more comprehensive than the "conclusions" sections of the then current estimates, but more condensed than the then current estimates. This would permit the basic NIE to be more detailed and complete with a fuller presentation of the evidence. Annexes could provide background information on major issues, and there could be greater use of maps, charts and graphs.

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- There should be a greater effort to evaluate Soviet doctrine and strategy together with discussion of the fundamental differences of opinion within the intelligence community. These could be incorporated in the "basic estimate" and this might obviate the need to issue a separate NIE 11-4 \* as frequently as in the past.
- The "summary estimates" would be written after the basic estimates were completed and would give an over-view of major Soviet weapons systems and describe significant changes in Soviet forces. They would also include a discussion of the general nature of Soviet military expenditures. The "summary estimates" for 11-3 \*\* and 11-8 \*\*\* should be combined into a single paper so policy makers would have in one document an assessment of the main elements of information on Soviet strategic forces which have to be taken into consideration in calculating the US-Soviet strategic balance. This would be useful, for example, in discussing US options for the SALT negotiations.
- The estimates might contain a brief statistical summary of US forces, including forward projections drawn from the OSD FYDP, to give the reader a basis for comparing US and Soviet forces.

c. The suggestions of the Secretary of Defense were as follows:

- Consideration should be given to relegating much of the detailed quantitative and qualitative analyses of Soviet weaponry to appropriate appendices. This would leave in the main body of the NIE only the more critical aspects of strategic weapons systems. The main body should also contain changes, disagreements of the intelligence community, and levels of confidence inherent in the principal judgments.

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\* "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy"

\*\* "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses"

\*\*\* "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"

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- The estimates, especially the strategic attack and defense papers, should be revised and updated more often, perhaps quarterly. (The NIE on an annual basis was said to be of questionable usefulness a few months after its issuance.)
- It would be useful to include five-year estimates in the NIEs, perhaps less precise than the short-term estimates but more definitive than the ten-year trends of the then current estimates.
- Each NIE should have a section comparing major judgments of the previous NIE with the current judgment. Divergencies could be explained and tendencies to consistently over-estimate or under-estimate should be brought to the attention of the policy-maker so that he could determine the "hedge" factor he must introduce in decisions regarding defense programming and planning.

d. The change which both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommended--that a condensed statement of the principal findings of Soviet military estimates be prepared for the top policy-makers-- was adopted and NIE's on these subjects now have a lengthy summary and conclusions section at their beginning. Another suggestion of the Secretary of State was also adopted and resulted in a deeper probe of Soviet military strategy. NIE 11-4 (now "Issues and Options in Soviet Military Policy") has been retitled and considerably expanded in scope and depth. The Secretary of Defense's suggestion to include five-year estimates of Soviet force levels was also adopted, but in the form of several alternate projections for force levels, depending on assumptions as to the success of SALT talks, US alternate force levels, etc.

#### 6. Meeting with the White House Staff in 1970

The Board of National Estimates and its staff members conducted a series of meetings in 1970 with the staff of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs concerning the form and content of military estimates. As a result of these meetings, a great deal more factual material was included in the estimates, together with

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an expanded discussion of the factors leading to the conclusions of the estimate. On 8 March 1971 the President commended the DCI and "the entire intelligence community" for NIE 11-8-70 which the President said was a considerable improvement over the previous version. He stated that he found particularly useful:

"--The frequent sharply-defined, clearly argued discussions of the various contested issues.

"--The attempt to incorporate a wide range of sources, such as clandestine reports and Soviet SALT statements.

"--The alternative force models based on explicit differences in underlying assumptions and the attempt to define which were the more likely models.

"--The quantitative detail for each model which illustrates the differences between the models and gives an operational meaning to some of the general statements."

#### C. SURVEY OF CONSUMER REACTIONS TO NIS PRODUCTS (1969)

7. Background. In response to a request of 3 October 1968 by CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Director of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, who was also Chairman of the USIB National Intelligence Survey Committee, surveyed recipients of the NIS products "to reassess the utility of the National Intelligence Survey Program \* and the extent to which it fulfills current needs."

\* The National Intelligence Survey Program was undertaken in January 1948 in response to National Security Council Intelligence Directives and was designed to produce basic intelligence--"factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature" to cover "foreign countries, areas, or broad special subjects." The outline of requirements is maintained by CIA in collaboration with the appropriate departments and agencies. Under a coverage plan of 1968 General Surveys of 33 areas of high strategic importance were to be updated at intervals of three years or less; General Surveys of some 75 other areas were to be revised about every four years. In addition, the plan provided for an average of seven expansions of subjects for each General Survey produced, depending on perishability of subject matter and resource availability. The NIS program thus is one of the larger production efforts of the intelligence community.

8. Survey Methodology. Reassessment of the NIS Program was undertaken through a number of separate approaches that included:

- a. A user questionnaire which sought to reach as wide a range of users as possible.
- b. Interviews in the field with U. S. military, diplomatic and civilian intelligence officers stationed in 20 foreign countries in Europe, Africa and the Far East.
- c. Discussions with other U. S. intelligence producers regarding individual NIS products.
- d. A contractor study of the potential use of automatic data systems in the NIS program.
- e. A reexamination of printing methods and costs to determine whether economics in NIS production were feasible.

Only the first two of the approaches listed above will be further discussed since the latter three do not involve consumer reactions to the NIS program.

9. NIS User Survey Questionnaire \*

- a. Because of the wide range of NIS recipients located in many areas throughout the world, the questionnaire method was chosen as the most effective means of assessing NIS usefulness. Questionnaires were distributed through normal NIS dissemination channels and not through "chains of command" in order that the responses would come from the actual recipients rather than from their organizations.
- b. The questionnaire was contrived with the aid of personnel from the Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division of CIA's Office of Research and Development. It was structured to elicit information through "Yes" or "No" and multiple-choice answers, and it provided for negative comments, personal criticisms, and for suggestions for program improvement. The questionnaire was also designed to elicit responses which would indicate:

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\* Copy of questionnaire at Tab 2.

- (1) The organizational levels at which the NIS is used;
- (2) Regularity of receipt of NIS sections;
- (3) Receipt and use of the NIS Production Status Report (which provides information on sections completed);
- (4) Degree of NIS use (regularly, occasionally, rarely, or never);
- (5) Type of use (background, research and analysis, briefings, plans and operations, and other);
- (6) Whether the user considered himself a "regular" or "infrequent" user of the NIS (and to rank the reasons for his choice); and
- (7) How useful the NIS was in crash or crisis situations.

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10. Response. Some 2,338 copies of the questionnaire were disseminated and 1,048 responses (45 percent) were received in time to be assessed. In terms of numbers of replies, the survey was considered quite successful, particularly in view of the very wide variety of users and the geographical and organizational remoteness from Washington of some of the respondents. The high rate of return indicated to those conducting the survey that the data were accurate for analytical purposes. The questionnaire responses provided:

- a. A relative ranking of NIS users among the various government departments, both in Washington and in the field;
- b. A relative ranking of the various NIS products both by specific user and in general;
- c. An idea of the purposes for which NIS products were being used. (Results were: background, 39 percent; as an aid in production, 30 percent; for briefings, 17 percent; for operational planning, 11 percent; and other, 3 percent.)
- d. An indication of "regular" or "infrequent" users;

e. User expressed reasons for "regular" or "infrequent" use;

f. An indication of the usefulness of NIS products to specific recipients in crisis situations;

g. An indication that about one third of the respondents felt the NIS products should be kept more current;

h. Evidence that an appreciable number of NIS users (11 percent of those responding to the questionnaire) were of the opinion that NIS sections should contain more detail of one sort or another; the need for lower classification, a loose-leaf format, additional dissemination, and better graphics were other criticisms expressed in some of the replies.

The responses, with their evidence as to the purposes for which NIS products were used, were considered by the survey sponsors to confirm the validity of the concept of the NIS. Despite the large number of replies, however, the survey did not provide practical guidance as to how the NIS program might be changed to make it more responsive to consumer needs.

11. Field Interviews. Three members of the Office of Basic and General Intelligence conducted extensive personal field interviews in U. S. embassies and consulates, CIA stations and principal military commands in 19 countries of Europe, Africa and the Far East, and queried some 140 U. S. officials on their use of the NIS. In addition, to sample NIS use in an active warfare situation principal U. S. military commands in South Vietnam were contacted. These interviews verified that, in general, the NIS was of wide use and high value to senior U. S. military staffs, but of less use to diplomatic missions. Endorsement of the NIS by military command staffs tended to be sweeping. For example, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and ARPAC officers referred to the NIS as "most valuable," "widely used," the "basic intelligence encyclopedia of the Pacific Fleet," and a "bible over the years." In South Vietnam, COMNAVFORV was "full of praise" for the NIS, maintaining that it "could not do without it." The J-2 of MACV considered the NIS "indispensable." Sponsors of the survey considered this personal interview methodology was a useful way to verify the utility of an intelligence product and to obtain a sound impression of the value of the product and the specific uses to which it is being put.

12. Results. Overall, neither the questionnaire nor the field interviews, nor a combination of the two, provided data which represented a consensus as to how the NIS products might be changed to increase their utility to their consumers. Nevertheless, there was clear indication that the General Survey was regarded as the most useful section on each country. This finding, along with tighter budgetary limitations, has led the NIS staff to put increased production emphasis on General Survey sections at the expense of some of the more detailed sections of the program. The survey also had indicated that many recipients of the NIS were not, from the viewpoint of the producers, sufficiently familiar with the NIS program to take the initiative in offering criticisms or suggestions for change. To encourage such comments, each new NIS publication now contains a form in which user comments are solicited.

D. SURVEY OF READERS OF THE CIA SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (1965)

13. In February 1965 the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA conducted a survey of readers of the Scientific Intelligence Digest "to determine means of increasing its usefulness." A questionnaire \* was attached to the February issue of the Digest on which readers were invited to indicate their preferences as to scope of coverage, amount of detail, and style of presentation of items in the Digest. Recipients were invited to give their names, titles and organizations. About 850 copies of the questionnaire were circulated and 110 replies were received.

14. Some of the more explicit responses indicated that the Digest was used principally for general background and secondarily for research data; that its articles were sufficiently detailed and timely; that subject coverage was not sufficient (particularly in the aerospace and missile fields); that regularly scheduled surveys of broad fields would be welcome; and that more articles on "hardware" and more comparisons of foreign with U. S. R&D would be desirable.

15. The survey was not considered successful by its sponsor, not only because of the limited number of responses, but also because of conflicting results (i. e., on several key questions, opinion was divided nearly evenly on whether or not the scope, content, and subject matter of the Digest should be altered). Thus, the survey provided no clear indication to the producers as to what general or specific improvements should be made in the Digest.

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\* Copy is attached as Tab 3

E. SURVEY OF READERS OF THE CIA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY (1971) \*

16. The decision to elicit readership reaction to the two weekly publications of the CIA Office of Current Intelligence arose from internal debate regarding their format and content. The publications had gone through a number of evolutionary changes over a period of nearly twenty years and it was thought worthwhile to seek reaction from readers both as to the value of the publications and to changes which might be made to increase their usefulness.

17. In January 1971, the Office of Current Intelligence sent out a questionnaire \*\* with its two weekly publications to elicit readership comments. A total of 2,230 questionnaires were disseminated and 645 responses were received in time to be analyzed. In addition, interviews were conducted with some Washington area recipients, including those in the State Department and DIA.

18. One of the weeklies was found to be the sole source of current intelligence for only about five percent of the respondents. More than 85 percent stated they used one or the other of the two publications primarily for obtaining general background information. Other data indicated how much of the publications were usually read, why articles were read (i. e., to see what OCI was saying about events in individual readers' fields, for intelligence briefings, or for teaching purposes, etc.). Miscellaneous other findings included information on how many readers there were per issue received at a given organization, how many readers filed the entire issue or selected articles, the degree of satisfaction with the length and detail of articles, and opinions as to whether the articles contained sufficient analysis. Fewer than 10 percent of the responses contained concrete suggestions for improvement.

19. The returned questionnaires contained only two or three ideas which would involve any major changes in the Review and the Summary, and OCI concluded that "OCI itself is the Weekly's harshest critic." The readership was found to be "surprisingly uncritical and most are probably prepared to accept the producers' decisions as to what should be reported."

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\* The Summary is a higher classification version of the Review.

\*\* A copy of the questionnaire is at Tab 4.

20. Interviews with State Department and DIA personnel produced no clear indication as to where changes should be made. DIA suggested that a special codeword version of the Weekly be produced, thereby permitting it to include more sensitive information. Those interviewed in the State Department indicated that the Weekly Review was regularly utilized in briefings by INR, that the publication was valuable, and was read by about 200 State personnel. INR representatives also suggested that the classification of the Review might be raised, but in view of the special distribution and storage problems this would occasion, OCI decided not to follow this course.

F. SURVEY OF DIA FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS (1970)

21. Background. In January 1970 the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, formed a Finished Intelligence Products Review Committee, comprised of DIA and service representatives, and charged it with making an objective review of DIA's planning, management, and accomplishment of finished intelligence\* production. The goals of the review were to identify product requirements, priorities and responsiveness; production duplication; and assignment of product responsibilities. The effort was undertaken because of budgetary pressures and because of criticism that some DoD intelligence products had little utility. The project was completed in June 1970.

22. Survey Methodology. Two basic types of data were needed: production data on each product such as the requirement which the product was intended to satisfy, cost of product, frequency, etc.; and user data on the value, utility, and priority of each product as seen by its principal consumers. Questionnaires were developed to elicit the data needed from both producers and consumers\*\*.

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\* Finished intelligence was defined as "finished basic and current intelligence in the form of estimates, studies, reports, summaries, contributions, briefs, periodicals, handbooks, ADPS products, annotated maps, and other materials of a similar nature produced on a recurring basis by DIA and the services." Included also were U&S command products which received dissemination and use outside the U&S command. Excluded were mapping and charting, counterintelligence and intelligence collection products, intelligence briefings, and intelligence information reports from either HUMINT or technical sources.

\*\* Copies are attached at Tabs 5 and 6.

a. The questionnaire approach was chosen because it would cost substantially less than interviewing the many consumers of DoD intelligence products. Unlike the NIS survey described in Section C, the DoD survey queried recipients as organizations, not as individuals. The rationale was that this approach would encompass a much more manageable number of responses and that the responses would be more related to user organization missions and functions than to the reactions of individual recipients.

b. The main objective of the user questionnaire was to elicit candid evaluations as to the relative value and usefulness of the various DoD intelligence products. A secondary objective was to identify areas in which consumer requirements were not being fully satisfied. Users were asked to name the products actually used and to rank them within categories (i. e., estimates, current intelligence, general intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence) according to their usefulness. The users also were requested to identify specific products which were not considered sufficiently timely or were not responsive to needs, and to indicate those which were considered to duplicate other products unnecessarily. Finally, users were asked to state their requirements for additional products.

c. The producer questionnaire was designed, in addition to eliciting information on the products themselves, to draw upon the experience and perspective of the producing organizations for appraisals of their own intelligence products.

### 23. Producer Response.

a. The Review Committee determined that there were 508 DoD intelligence publications produced on a recurring basis: 228 by DIA, 41 by the services, and 239 by the U&S commands. The producer survey identified those products which had firm documented authorization; those which were initiated in anticipation of a specific need; those which the producers "presumed" had adequate authorization; products which had been taken over by DIA from the services in 1963, but not since revalidated; and a number of products for which there was no identifiable authorization, but which the producer assumed were inherent in his mission. In addition, the producer response provided dollar and manpower costs associated with the various products.



b. On a scale of "High," "Average (+)," "Average (-)," "Low," only 19 products were considered of "Low" value by the producers, while 166 were given a "High" rating. A total of 147 products were judged by producers to be duplicative of or duplicated by other products. The producer response uncovered a number of candidates for elimination because they were duplicative or covered subjects on which production responsibility could be shared, transfered, or terminated.

24. User Response. A total of 151 DoD and non-DoD organizations participated in the User Survey; all but nine responded positively. The respondents were: within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (5); within the JCS organization (23); service and departmental organizations and commands (58); U&S commands (8); U&S subordinate commands (40); and non-DoD organizations (8). Some 12,800 individual product ratings were provided.

## 25. Results

a. Data received and analyzed by priority ratings led to the specific recommendations by the Review Committee to the Director of DIA that:

(1) Certain DIA products be terminated or modified, having been identified as of marginal user utility;

(2) Certain DIA products be corrected to improve timeliness, responsiveness, eliminate duplication, and satisfy specific requirements;

(3) A new organizational element be established within DIA to provide for an effective producer-user interface and perform consumer needs analysis; and

(4) The Committee's report and supporting data be made available to the services and the U&S commands for their use in evaluating their own intelligence production.

b. As a result of these recommendations, DIA has reduced the number of serial publications produced within the Defense Department by about 40 -- or just under 10 percent of the total surveyed. In addition, some other products have been consolidated and attempt has been made to tailor products, particularly

in the scientific and technical area, more particularly to the needs of specific consumers. Efforts to streamline production are continuing, partly as a result of more stringent budgets, but also as follow-on to the guidance provided by the DIA products survey. While the questionnaire responses indicated some intelligence products were of limited utility and could be eliminated, and some products were duplicative, the survey did not provide DIA with clearcut guidelines as to how products could be generally improved. The study participants did not consider, however, that the survey results would have been substantially different had the recipients been queried as individuals rather than as organizational representatives.

G. PROJECT MARKET SURVEY OF THE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY DIVISION/AFSC (1968-1970)

26. Background. In December 1968 the Foreign Technology Division, (FTD), Air Force Systems Command, established Project MARKET SURVEY to determine how well its products were satisfying their users. The project was also intended to correct certain deficiencies in the Foreign Technology Program noted in a report of the USAF Inspector General.

27. Survey Methodology

a. The survey was conducted in two phases. Phase I involved a questionnaire approach conducted within the laboratories at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in the spring of 1969; Phase II followed an evaluation of the results of Phase I and was broader and conducted within the Aeronautical Systems Division of the Systems Command. This phase lasted from September 1969 to April 1970.

b. Phase I of Project MARKET SURVEY traced specific consumer requirements which had been submitted to FTD through the Director of Foreign Technology at the Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC. The products associated with these requirements were identified and the initiator of the requirement was contacted and asked to evaluate the responsiveness of the product to the initial requirement. Twenty-three formal, documented requirements were selected at random and 27 studies and handbooks were identified as associated with these requirements. Twenty-one organizational elements were found to be the originators of the intelligence requirements. A questionnaire was completed for each product responding to each requirement (a total of 33 questionnaires were completed) and some 24 consumers were interviewed.

c. Phase II, essentially an expansion of the earlier effort, employed a questionnaire designed to elicit more information about FTD product consumers--their knowledge, use and opinion of the system and what they believed their needs for intelligence were. In this case the questionnaires were sent to organizations and not individuals. Two hundred sixty-seven questionnaires were sent out and 124 were returned.

## 28. Survey Results

a. Phase I findings indicated that most of the consumers were in the exploratory development area and their primary function was analysis. Most were interested in the "state of their art" in foreign countries, and not simply because they required particular information for program support. Most users were found not to be sufficiently familiar with the requirements procedure. Phase I indicated to FTD the degree to which its products were being used and the extent to which consumers were dissatisfied because of incompleteness of data and lack of detail. FTD also found that many of the initiators of requirements had not attempted to find out what information was available before submitting their requirements. In short, Phase I provided a measure of the extent to which the system was not supplying the right products to the R&D consumers who had a legitimate need for intelligence, and that these consumers generally did not understand the system.

b. Analysis of Phase II data demonstrated that the consumers did have a real need for intelligence, that those needs were not being completely satisfied, and that some of the intelligence being provided was not highly regarded by consumers. The data also indicated that consumers were not familiar with the products, intelligence services and support available to them. The problem of determining what products FTD should concentrate on was sufficiently complex that it was clear no one "production mix" could satisfy the needs of all the consumers.

c. The basic conclusion from Project MARKET SURVEY was that FTD should become more "marketing" sensitive and less production oriented, i. e., that it should develop more direct interface with its consumers, both to make these customers more aware of the intelligence support which could be made available and to enable FTD to be more immediately aware of consumer needs.

## CONSUMER EVALUATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIE)

### PURPOSE

This evaluation is an element of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) Working Group program to provide explicit feedback to intelligence producers from consumers. This evaluation should not be prepared by intelligence personnel. What is sought is a user evaluation of an intelligence product.

### INSTRUCTIONS

Evaluators are requested to complete this form within 30 days of receipt.

Security classification of the completed form will be based on the classification of the estimate being commented upon and classification of the comments included in the evaluation.

The completed evaluation is to be forwarded to:

D/DCI/IC  
ATTN: PRG/IC  
Room 6E18  
CIA Headquarters  
Washington, D. C. 20505

ANNEX A

DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF  
SURVEYS OF CONSUMER REACTION  
TO  
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

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NIE EVALUATION REPORT

A. NIE No. and Title \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of Publication \_\_\_\_\_

B. Evaluator Address \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

C. NIE Utility and Timeliness

1. Primary use to which NIE is being or will be put:

- |                                  |                                |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| a. Policy planning _____         | d. Military R&D planning _____ |
| b. Operations planning _____     | e. Background info. _____      |
| c. Military force planning _____ | f. Other (specify) _____       |

2. Timeliness of the estimate

- a. Very timely \_\_\_\_\_ b. Timely \_\_\_\_\_ c. Not timely \_\_\_\_\_

If c is checked, why is the estimate not considered timely?

3. Utility of the NIE for ongoing or anticipated policy/operations problems:

- |                               |                           |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| a. Absolutely necessary _____ | d. Nice to have _____     |
| b. Very useful _____          | e. Little or no use _____ |
| c. Useful _____               |                           |

If a, b, or c is checked, which sections or portions of the estimate were particularly useful (i.e., provided specific and unique information or judgments directly applicable to policy/operations)

4. If some other source currently satisfied the need for this estimative information in an equally useful or comparable fashion, identify such source:

D. Scope and Format

1. The scope and format of the estimate are:
  - a. Excellent \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Satisfactory \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Unsatisfactory \_\_\_\_\_
2. If c. was checked, how could the scope and/or format of the estimate be improved? To accomplish what purposes?

E. Factual Data

1. For purposes of your organization, the degree to which factual data is presented is:
  - a. Excessive \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Sufficient \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Not enough \_\_\_\_\_
2. If a. or c. was checked, for what purposes would more/less detail improve the utility of the estimate?

F. Expression of Uncertainties

1. The uncertainties relating to the data or the situations described are brought out:
  - a. Excellently \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Satisfactorily \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Inadequately \_\_\_\_\_
2. For purposes of your organization, the estimate treats the full range of uncertainties:
  - a. Very well \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Adequately \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Inadequately \_\_\_\_\_
3. If the answer to 1. and/or 2. is c., how could the treatment of uncertainty have been improved?



G. Expression of Alternatives

1. For purposes of your organization, the range of alternative projections and the description of each alternative are:
  - a. Quite comprehensive \_\_\_\_
  - b. Adequate \_\_\_\_
  - c. Inadequate \_\_\_\_
2. If c. was checked, in what manner could the presentation have been improved?

H. Quality of the Estimative Logic

1. The extent to which the analysis logically ties together the factual and estimative elements of the paper is:
  - a. Excellent \_\_\_\_
  - b. Satisfactory \_\_\_\_
  - c. Inadequate \_\_\_\_
2. If c. was checked, in what manner might the quality of the estimate have been improved?

I. Overall Reaction to the Estimate

(Note: The purpose of this section is to encourage you to summarize your reactions to the estimate and to present such additional comments as you consider useful as feedback to the intelligence community. If you have made hand-written notes on the estimate itself, it would be appreciated if the estimate is returned with the evaluation form.)

1. The following words or phrases characterise this estimate:
  - a. Exceptionally valuable \_\_\_\_
  - b. Stimulating and persuasive \_\_\_\_
  - c. Imaginative new viewpoint \_\_\_\_
  - d. Rehash of conventional wisdom \_\_\_\_
  - e. Shallow and unconvincing \_\_\_\_
  - f. Dull \_\_\_\_

2. Basis for the foregoing characterization of the estimate is:

3. In summary, your overall comments as to the extent to which the estimate met the requirements of your organization are as follows:

Date of this response

NIE Number \_\_\_\_\_

Copy Number \_\_\_\_\_

Position of the User: \_\_\_\_\_  
Descriptive Title Office

1. My professional responsibilities are mainly in the field of (Check one)

- (a) policy planning and coordination
- (b) operations
- (c) intelligence
- ☒ (d) keeping my superior informed
- (e) research (to recall?)
- (f) \_\_\_\_\_

(Other: please specify)

2. My substantive responsibilities are (Check one)

- (a) general in scope
- (b) primarily concerned with matters involving \_\_\_\_\_

(indicate country, regional or functional specialization)

3. I normally see, or am briefed on (Check one)

- (a) all NIEs
- (b) all NIEs bearing on my special responsibilities
- (c) only NIEs specifically requested by me or brought to my attention

4. As a rule, I (Check one)

- (a) rely primarily on briefings to keep myself informed on the content of NIEs
- (b) read NIE Conclusions only
- (c) read the entire NIE myself
- (d) read NIEs primarily in order to brief a superior

5, I first learned of the present NIE (Check one)

- (a) on receiving it
- (b) through USIB Committee papers
- (c) through reference to NIE files, the NIE index, or other reference service
- (d) through reference to it by a professional colleague
- (e) through participation in its preparation
- (f) through other means (specify)

6, I am using this estimate (Check one)

- (a) in connection with actions on its subject now before my office
- (b) for purposes of briefing a superior
- (c) for background information

7, The value of this estimate for my purposes is (Check one)

- (a) major
- (b) moderate
- (c) little
- (d) none

8, I expect that I will cite, quote, or summarize this estimate (Check one)

- (a) in papers prepared in my office
- (b) in coordination of other papers and other discussions
- (c) seldom, if ever

9, I expect that I will probably (Check one)

- (a) not refer to this estimate again
- (b) refer to it frequently in the future
- (c) refer to it once or twice in the future

10, I regard estimates as useful and dependable (Check one)

- (a) only at the time they are issued
- (b) only for the first \_\_\_\_\_ months or so after issuance
- (c) until superseded
- (d) there is no general rule; it depends on the particular estimate

11, This copy will be retained in <sup>(a)</sup>personal files. (Circle one)

- (b) office
- (c) central

14 January 1969


MEMORANDUM FOR: All NIS Recipients  
FROM : National Intelligence Survey Committee  
SUBJECT : NIS User Questionnaire

1. National Intelligence Survey Program emphasis since 1963 has been on the production of the single-volume *General Survey* on all areas of national security interest. Revised periodically, the *General Survey* is supported by detailed topical units produced on a highly selective basis; it is complemented by the semiannual NIS *Basic Intelligence Factbook*, which provides interim updating of basic data for all NIS Areas.

2. The attached questionnaire is an integral part of an overall effort to assess the validity of the current NIS structure and emphasis, to ascertain the utility of the Program, and to determine how it might better serve user needs. Because the data compiled from the questionnaire will be critical to future NIS planning, please respond fully and precisely to all questions that apply to you. The completed questionnaire should be returned as soon as possible but not later than 1 March 1969 using the envelope provided.

JAMES A. BRAMMELL  
Chairman  
NIS Committee

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(When Filled In)

Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. Agency \_\_\_\_\_

Component/location \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose or principal activity (military planning, foreign aid, briefing, research,  
etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

Your position (job title) \_\_\_\_\_

Your fields of responsibility (geographic area and/or specialty) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Is the NIS Production Status Report available for your use? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Do you regularly use it? ☐ Yes ☐ No

3. Receipt of NIS units is:

☐ Regular and  
systematic

☐ Irregular, with  
some gaps

☐ Sporadic and  
uncertain

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(When Filled In)

## 4. Below is a list of available NIS publications.

a) Indicate in column I the frequency of use by means of the following symbols:

A=Regularly

B=Occasionally

C=Rarely

D=Never

b) Indicate in column II your use, according to the following symbols (multiple uses may be indicated):

1=Planning and operations

2=Research, analysis, and production

3=Briefings

4=General background and orientation

5=Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Col. I	Col. II	Col. I	Col. II
—	—	—	—
—	General Survey (check sections used most frequently)	—	Telecommunications
—	— Chronology	—	Population
—	— Introduction	—	Characteristics of the People
—	— Geography	—	Religion, Education, and Public Information
—	— Transp. and Telecom.	—	Manpower
—	— Sociological	—	Health and Sanitation
—	— Political	—	Intelligence and Security
—	— Economic	—	Subversion and Insurgency
—	— Scientific	—	Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry
—	— Armed Forces	—	Fuels
—	— Area Brief	—	Electric Power
—	— Summary Map	—	Minerals and Metals
—	Basic Intelligence Factbook	—	Manufacturing and Construction
—	Coasts and Landing Beaches	—	Trade and Finance
—	Weather and Climate	—	Armed Forces
—	Meteorological Organization and Facilities	—	Marine Climate
—	Topography	—	Oceanography
—	Urban Areas		
—	Railroads		
—	Highways		
—	Inland Waterways		
—	Ports and Naval Facilities		
—	Merchant Marine		
—	Civil Air		

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5. In general, do you consider yourself:

- ☐ a. Regular user of NIS publications
- ☐ b. Infrequent user

6. If you checked 5,a, above, which of the following best describes NIS usefulness:  
(If more than one applies, indicate rank by using 1 for highest.)

- ☐ Principal source of information
- ☐ Secondary source
- ☐ Supplies information in a conveniently assembled form not otherwise available
- ☐ Supplies corroborative information
- ☐ Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

7. If you checked 5,b, above, which of the following best describes your reasons for only infrequent use:  
(If more than one applies, indicate rank by using 1 for highest.)

- ☐ Not readily available
- ☐ Not sufficiently current
- ☐ Too summarized and generalized
- ☐ Too detailed
- ☐ Only marginally related to my needs
- ☐ Needs filled by other publications (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ NIS of value only in conjunction with other publications (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- ☐ Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Has the NIS been consulted for crisis situations, crash projects, or emergency planning?

- ☐ Yes    ☐ No    Why? \_\_\_\_\_

If you checked "Yes" above, how useful was it under these circumstances?

- ☐ Excellent    ☐ Good    ☐ Adequate    ☐ Marginal



CONFIDENTIAL  
(When Filled In)

9. With reference to the NIS publications listed in 4, above, what are the major shortcomings you have found in the NIS? (Please relate these to your own needs, considering adequacy of coverage, reliability of content, currency, length and detail of presentation, and security classification.) \_\_\_\_\_

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(answer may be continued on the reverse)

10. What specific suggestions can you make for improving the content (including graphics), coverage, organization, and format of NIS units? \_\_\_\_\_

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(answer may be continued on the reverse)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature (optional)

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The Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA, is conducting a survey of readers of the Scientific Intelligence Digest to determine means of increasing its usefulness. Although the availability of source material and classification requirements often severely restrict the content of the Digest, other aspects such as scope of coverage, amount of detail and style of presentation can be varied to fit consumer needs. Therefore, after reviewing the attached issue, would you please indicate your preferences on this form and return it to CIA/OSI, 2430 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

1. How useful is it in your work?  
Very valuable ( ); valuable ( ); of negligible value ( ).
2. Is it applicable to your needs?  
For policy making ( ); for research data ( ); for general background ( );  
for collection purposes ( ); other (please list)\_\_\_\_\_.
3. Is the scientific or technical subject area coverage sufficient for your purposes?  
Yes ( ); no ( ). If no, please specify topics you would like to be included.
4. Would regularly scheduled survey articles such as "Major Soviet Developments in Physics for 1964" be of value to you?  
Yes ( ); no ( ). If yes, please suggest titles.
5. Would you prefer more or fewer items on hardware and applications?  
More ( ); no change ( ); less ( ).
6. Would you prefer more or fewer items on basic research and theory?  
More ( ); no change ( ); less ( ).
7. Would you prefer more or fewer comparisons with U.S. research and development and state-of-the-art?  
More ( ); no change ( ); less ( ).
8. Is the geographic area coverage sufficient for your purposes?  
Yes ( ); no ( ). If no, please list desired area coverage.
9. Do you prefer short, single-source limited scope articles or longer articles broader in scope?  
Shorter ( ); longer ( ).

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10. Do the articles carry sufficient detail for your purposes?  
Yes ( ); no ( ).
11. Would you prefer the items to include more or less technical terminology?  
More ( ); no change ( ); less ( ).
12. Is the Digest published frequently enough to provide you with timely information?  
Yes ( ); no ( ). If no, would you prefer a weekly ( ) or biweekly ( ).

If you have other suggestions for improving the Scientific Intelligence Digest, please include them.

To assist us in evaluating replies, please give your name, title, and organization below.

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ANNEX A

Tab 4

SECRET

TO: Central Intelligence Agency  
Office of Current Intelligence  
Headquarters Room 7F24  
McLean, Virginia

ATTENTION: Chief, Production Staff

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR READERS OF THE  
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

1. Is the Weekly Summary with its Special Reports your only source of current intelligence? ☐ Yes ☒ No
2. Do you read articles ☐ in your field only ☒ or all of the Summary - Special Reports?
3. Do you share a copy with other readers? ☒ Yes ☐ No  
How many others? 4
4. How do you use the Summary - Special Reports in your work:  
☒ as a source of general background information?  
☒ as a supplement to news magazines and newspapers?  
☒ to see what others are thinking in your field?  
☐ other?
5. Do you ☐ save the whole Weekly Summary - Special Reports? ☒ keep some articles?  
☐ destroy after reading?
6. Do you ☒ reproduce all or any part of the Weekly Summary - Special Reports? ☐ Yes ☐ No  
How many other persons get copies? 1
7. Are the articles in the Weekly Summary ☐ too long? ☐ too short? ☐ too detailed? ☐ not detailed enough? *About right*
8. Are the Special Reports ☐ too long? ☐ too short? ☐ too detailed? ☐ not detailed enough? *About right, but occasionally more details and analysis would be helpful*
9. Does the Weekly Summary cover ☐ too many subjects? ☐ too few subjects?
10. Are the Special Reports generally of ☒ equal value, ☐ more value, or ☐ less value than the Weekly Summary?
11. Do you think that ☐ there is an overemphasis on certain areas or subjects? ☐ Do some subjects never seem to appear? Which ones? \_\_\_\_\_
12. Do the articles contain ☐ enough or ☒ not enough analysis in contrast to straight reporting?
13. Are the maps and graphics generally helpful? ☒ Yes ☐ No  
Should there be more? ☒ Yes ☐ No
14. Do you think that the table of contents is useful? ☒ Yes ☐ No
15. What other comments do you have on the Weekly Summary - Special Reports? What changes would you like to see made? *A greater number of Special Reports (eg, a quarterly "history" of the Vietnam war), with greater detail and more analysis*

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(Date)PRODUCER QUESTIONNAIRE

(If more space is required for any answer, attach additional sheet(s) keyed to questionnaire by item number)

Product family \_\_\_\_\_

Product category \_\_\_\_\_

Product type/product \_\_\_\_\_

Producer or contributor \_\_\_\_\_

## 1. Description:

a. Subject matter \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

b. Geographic area \_\_\_\_\_

c. Frequency \_\_\_\_\_

d. Number produced annually \_\_\_\_\_

2. a. Requestor \_\_\_\_\_

b. Date of requirement \_\_\_\_\_

c. Date requirement last validated by user(s) \_\_\_\_\_

3. If production authority is unknown give rationale for production  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## 4. Cost:

a. Direct cost in manhours \_\_\_\_\_

b. Other direct costs in dollars \_\_\_\_\_

5. a. Based on your knowledge does use of the product type/product justify the effort expended in its production? YES\_\_\_\_, NO\_\_\_\_

b. Provide brief rationale for your answer\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. In terms of overall significance/utility how does this product type/product compare with other products you produce?  
More significant\_\_\_\_, About the same\_\_\_\_, Less significant\_\_\_\_.

7. a. Does any other known product type/product duplicate this one? YES\_\_\_\_, NO\_\_\_\_.

b. If YES, identify the product(s) and the extent of duplication, i.e. major, moderate, minor.\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

c. Is the duplication identified desirable? YES\_\_\_\_, NO\_\_\_\_.  
Provide brief rationale for your answer\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. Name of finished intelligence production organization that controls or provides the major portion of the data base from which this product type/product is produced if other than your own organization.\_\_\_\_\_

9. Should another intelligence producer be charged with the production of this product type/product? If yes, identify and explain.\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. Should production responsibility for this product type/product be shared with another organization(s)? If yes, identify and explain.\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

11. Other comments or recommendations:\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE FILE 11

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING PRODUCER QUESTIONNAIRE

Header Information

Refer to "Products Inventory" for appropriate entries.

1. a. Include a brief statement on the purpose served by the product type/product and the nature, scope, and level of detail of intelligence coverage; e.g.  
  
"Produced in support of contingency planning and targeting. It includes a detailed listing of all transportation facilities with data on characteristics, capabilities, and vulnerabilities."  
  
b. Use geographic area/country codes in the FY 70-75 DIPS.  
  
c. Indicate how often a given product type/product is produced per time period.  
  
d. For "product types" indicate the number of individual products produced annually; e.g. TacCTAs - 18 per year.
2. a. Identify requestor or primary organization(s) for whom produced.  
  
b. Enter date of original request.  
  
c. Self-explanatory.
3. Self-explanatory.
4. a. Report only those manhours directly and uniquely attributable to production of this product type/product. Do not include manhours required to maintain the data base. For those products produced less frequently than annually, enter a pro-rated annual cost.
5. a. Self-explanatory.  
  
b. Self-explanatory.
6. Self-explanatory.
7. a. Self-explanatory.  
  
b. Self-explanatory.  
  
c. Self-explanatory.
8. For purposes of this survey, single source producers of intelligence information should not be considered.
9. Self-explanatory.
10. Self-explanatory.

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(Date)

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(Organization)

### USER QUESTIONNAIRE

(If more space is required for any answer, attach additional sheet(s) keyed to questionnaire by item number)

1. Circle the identification number of those product types/products in the "Products Inventory" which you use in support of your mission.
2. Considering only those product types/products for which the identification numbers have been circled:
  - a. Indicate in the priority column of the "Products Inventory" their rank order from the viewpoint of satisfaction of your mission. A separate priority ranking should be accomplished for each product family. (Use the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. -- 1 reflects the highest priority)
  - b. List the identification numbers of those items for which timeliness has been a problem and explain briefly.



2. (Cont'd)

- c. List the identification numbers of those items for which responsiveness (meeting your needs other than timeliness) has been a problem and explain briefly.

3. In your use of the product types/products listed in the "Products Inventory" have you found unnecessary duplication? If yes, list the identification numbers and explain.

4. In your use of the product types/products listed in the "Products Inventory" have you found unnecessary duplication between these and products received by your organization from non-DoD agencies? If yes, list the identification numbers of the items from the "Products Inventory" and the titles and producers of the products received from the non-DoD agencies and explain.

- 5.

6. Do you have a requirement for a product which is not now being produced? If so, define desired subject and scope and identify which of the existing products it would replace. Indicate its rank order position relative to existing products as noted in your response to paragraph 2.a.

7. Other comments or recommendations: